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Abstract 
Organizational information assets require protection and cannot be secured by technological 
means alone. This annotated bibliography, reviewing literature from 2004 to 2014, identifies the 
employee behavioral factors on which managers should focus to improve information systems 
security policy (ISSP) compliance within their organizations. The categories of biases, beliefs, 
perceptions, and motivations are discussed. Specific recommendations for managers include 
addressing human error, attitudes, social context, self-efficacy, and extrinsic motivations. 
 Keywords: information systems security policy, information security, compliance, 
behavioral factors, human factors, human error, motivation 
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Introduction to the Annotated Bibliography  
Problem 
Information is considered a valuable asset to organizations and thus requires protection, 
which is enacted through management and governance plans (Herath & Rao, 2009; Thomson & 
von Solms, 2005). Information assets, knowledge assets, and information capital all provide 
value to organizations (Berzkalne, & Zelgalve, 2014; Glazer, 1991; Kakabadse, Kouzmin, & 
Kakabadse, 2001;Wiig, 1997). The amount of value that these assets provide is considered 
significant, although the value may be difficult to quantify; developing accurate measures and 
accounting of such value is an evolving field of research (Bontis, 2001; Wilson & Stenson, 
2008). 
Organizational failures to secure information assets can result in a variety of negative 
outcomes. For example, a survey conducted by the Ponemon Institute, LLC (2013) reports that 
security breaches, such as disclosure of protected personal data, can cost companies millions of 
dollars. A company's market value may be significantly impacted from the public 
announcements of security breaches (Acquisti, Friedman, & Telang, 2006; Campbell, Gordon, 
Loeb, & Zhou, 2003; Goel & Shawky, 2009). Response costs, such as labor costs, to identify, 
eliminate, and recover from security breaches can also be incurred (Lee, Fan, Miller, Stolfo, & 
Zadok, 2002).  
Kruger and Kearney (2006) define information security as the focus “on protecting the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information” (p. 289). Herath and Rao (2009) point 
out that “information security cannot be achieved through only technological tools” and that 
“empirical research on end-user security behaviors and factors … is still in its infancy” (p.154). 
Focusing on end-user behaviors, e.g., human factors, is important as they are considered the 
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“weakest link” in information security (Huang, Rau, & Salvendy, 2007; Ifinedo, 2014; 
Warkentin & Willison, 2009). Examples of human factors that may influence ISSP compliance 
include biases in the areas of estimation and unrealistic optimism (Lichtenstein, Slovic, 
Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978; Weinstein, 1987). In addition, individuals who encounter 
novel situations may experience difficulty when making decisions that involve risk (Fischhoff, 
2002). These individuals may only rely on overly simplified responses and heuristics or "rules of 
thumb" (Fischhoff, 2002, p. 52). A survey conducted by the Ponemon Institute, LLC (2013) 
demonstrated that at least 35% of security breaches concerned human error. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this annotated bibliography is to identify behavioral factors within 
organizations that can improve information systems security compliance (ISSP), defined by 
Ifinedo (2012) as a “mechanism for shaping or influencing the behaviors of their employees with 
respect to how organizational IS resource [sic] are used” (p. 84). Sources that identify the human 
factors that directly affect compliance, such as human error, the ability to perceive risk, and the 
rewarding of positive behavior are examined (Australian Government, Department of Defence, 
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Division, Defence Science and 
Technology Organization, 2010). The effectiveness of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations as they 
relate to human factors with regards to ISSP compliance is also evaluated (Herath & Rao, 2009; 
Ruighaver, Maynard, & Chang, 2007; Son, 2011). Finally, sources are included that focus on the 
specific case of agency literature as applied to ISSP compliance using incentive and disincentive 
mechanisms (Herath & Rao, 2009), as well as literature that explores the larger context of 
agency relationships, defined by Herath and Rao (2009) as “whenever one party (principal) 
entrusts some decision making authority to another party (agent)” (p. 155). 
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However, technical implementation of industry and government information security 
policies and standards is not addressed (Höne & Eloff, 2002). Moreover, the problem does not 
focus on improving ISSP compliance for employees with malicious intent or ethical issues. 
Audience 
Rather than placing the onus of ISSP compliance on IT professionals, e.g., the Chief 
Security Officer, several authors target general management as being responsible for fostering 
and supporting a security culture. Ruighaver, Maynard, and Chang (2007) state that “security 
culture cannot be carried out in isolation of wider organizational culture,” in which managers are 
directly involved (p. 56). In addition, security processes can be impacted by daily, non-IT 
operations, requiring managers to be directly involved as stakeholders to ensure their success 
(Ruighaver, Maynard, & Chang, 2007). Ifinedo (2014) suggests “influential people in 
organisations who are capable of motivating or shaping the opinions of others could be tasked to 
champion the cause of ISSP compliance” (p.76). Pahnila, Siponen, and Mahmood (2007) find in 
their study that “positive social pressure (normative belief) towards IS security policy 
compliance from top management … is important for ensuring employees’ IS security policy 
compliance” (p.7).  
The target audience for this annotated bibliography is therefore organizational managers. 
Managers benefit from this annotated bibliography by learning techniques for improving ISSP 
compliance in behavioral and social contexts. In addition, managers explore literature that 
describes the lack of success that traditional methods, e.g., sanctions and penalties, may have on 
compliance (Ifinedo, 2014). 
Research Questions 
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Main question. On which employee behavioral factors should managers focus within 
their organizations to improve information security compliance? 
Sub-question.  How do behavioral factors influence employee behavior with regards to 
information security compliance? 
Search Strategy 
The University of Oregon Libraries’ OneSearch is used after connecting via the Cisco 
AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client. Initial searches use the terms information security and self-
efficacy against the default subject “General/Interdisciplinary,” i.e., the databases “Academic 
Search Premier,” “JSTOR,” “Project Muse,” and “Web of Science.” The results of these initial 
searches and suggested articles via the Elsevier ScienceDirect website helped refine the burning 
question and its subsequent search terms. Google Scholar is used repeatedly to confirm that 
relevant articles obtained through OneSearch and individual, off-site databases, are not missed. 
Databases. The following databases are used via OneSearch and external to the UO 
Library site: 
 Academic Search Premier 
 ACM Digital Library 
 ArSXiv.org 
 Computer Source 
 Google Scholar 
 IEEE Computer Science Digital Library 
 IEEE Xplore Digital Library 
 JSTOR 
 Project Muse 
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 ProQuest (and its sub-databases) 
 ScienceDirect 
 UO Local Catalog 
 Web of Science 
OneSearch databases in the following subject categories are also used but 
predominately duplicated the results found on the above databases: 
 Business 
 Psychology 
 Social Sciences 
 Sociology 
Terms. A thorough search yields the following list of terms; subsequent searches 
combine these search terms in a variety of ways: 
 information security 
 information security policy 
 information security awareness 
 compliance 
 self-efficacy 
 behavior/behavioral (behaviour/behavioural) 
 motivation 
 culture/cultural 
 social/socialization 
 relationships 
 human factors 
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 organizational 
 governance 
Documentation Approach 
Qualitative researchers should first focus on "establishing the protocol for recording 
information" before beginning their data recording procedures (Creswell, 2009, p. 181). The 
Zotero Standalone for Mac software package is chosen given its ability to "assist in writing 
papers, managing references, and organizing research materials" (Roy Rosenzweig Center for 
History and New Media, 2014a, 2014f; Vanhecke, 2008). Each reference is added to Zotero 
using the "Add Item(s) by Identifier" button and entering the journal article's Digital Object 
Identifier, if available (Digital Object Identifier System, 2014; Roy Rosenzweig Center for 
History and New Media, 2014b). The majority of journal articles added did not automatically 
populate the abstract field metadata, so this information is manually added. Additional metadata, 
such as search terms, article focus, and relevancy are tracked using Zotero's notes feature (Roy 
Rosenzweig Center for History and New Media, 2014e). PDF copies of journal articles, if 
available, are also uploaded into Zotero using the "Attach Stored Copy of File..." feature (Roy 
Rosenzweig Center for History and New Media, 2014c). Finally, journal articles are further 
sorted using the collection and subcollection feature to help classify the focus of each article to 
determine whether inclusion in the annotated bibliography and/or references is warranted (Roy 
Rosenzweig Center for History and New Media, 2014d). 
Reference Evaluation Criteria 
The credibility of each reference is evaluated before selection using Bell and Frantz's 
(2013) five areas: authority, objectivity, quality, currency, and relevancy. References are 
considered authoritative if they appear in either peer-reviewed journals or recognized conference 
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proceedings and the author is affiliated with a reputable institution (Bell & Frantz, 2013). 
Objectivity is evaluated by examining the author's stated purpose, potential biases, 
acknowledgement of any biases, and whether the author's conclusions are supported by evidence 
(Bell & Frantz, 2013). A high-quality reference is identified if the reference is clearly written and 
well organized—usually criteria for publication in peer-reviewed journals (Bell & Frantz, 2013). 
While numerous short magazine articles are found, e.g., via the “IEEE Computer Science Digital 
Library,” the results are not included as part of the reference material due to their lack of depth 
and possible lack of peer review. Currency is evaluated by sourcing articles within the last 10 
years, which demarcates the popularization of Web 2.0, beginning in 2004 (Lawton, 2007; 
O’Reilly, 2007). Reference materials appearing in the annotated bibliography may exceed the 
10-year time frame, especially in the fields of psychology and sociology, if they still are relevant 
to the research. Relevance is evaluated for each reference primarily based upon its source, such 
as peer-reviewed journals or popular press. In addition, the relevance of each source is examined 
for inclusion, and both primary sources representing research studies and secondary sources 
analyzing phenomena are included (Bell & Frantz, 2013). 
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Annotated Bibliography 
The following Annotated Bibliography presents 15 references that examine employee 
behavioral factors and their influence on ISSP compliance. These references help managers 
determine on which behavioral factors they should focus to improve information security 
compliance within their organizations. Each annotation consists of the full bibliographic citation, 
the full abstract, and a summary. The summaries represent the research findings and conclusions 
of the articles' authors. Each summary discusses the behavioral factors that may influence ISSP 
compliance; these behavioral factors are primarily from psychology and sociology research 
areas. The ultimate goal of the summaries is to provide managers with insight as to where they 
can best focus their efforts to increase ISSP compliance. 
 
Australian Government, Department of Defence, Command, Control, Communications  
and Intelligence Division, Defence Science and Technology Organization. (2010). 
Human factors and information security: Individual, culture and security environment. 
(DSTO-TR-2484). Retrieved from  
http://dspace.dsto.defence.gov.au/dspace/bitstream/1947/10094/1/DSTO-TR-
2484%20PR.pdf   
Abstract. The application of information security technologies do not always result in 
improved security. Human factors play a significant role in computer security; factors 
such as individual difference, cognitive abilities and personality traits can impact on 
behaviour. Information security behaviours are also greatly influenced by an individual’s 
perception of risk. All of these factors are also affected by the organisation culture and 
security environment in which they occur. These factors interact with one another and 
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can result in behaviours that are often detrimental to information security. This report 
provides recommendations as to how these human and cultural factors can be influenced 
to result in more positive behaviours and lead to more secure information environments. 
Summary. This article summarizes several human factors relating to risk perception and 
cognitive biases and discusses their potential impact on ISSP compliance: 
 Availability heuristic – the inaccurate estimation of an event's likelihood and 
importance based upon ease of recall (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Chronic, common risks, such as poorly documented 
ISSP procedures, are likely underestimated, while dramatic events like hacking are 
likely overestimated. 
 Optimism bias – the belief that the risk for negative outcomes is greater for others 
than for themselves (Sjöberg, 2000). For example, users may believe they would 
never be potential targets of hackers (McIlwraith, 2006). The bias can be 
compounded if users do not receive feedback or warnings that their insecure 
behaviors are creating further risk (Weinstein, 1987). 
 Level of control – the belief that threats are less risky in situations where individuals 
feel that they have control over their environment (Kreuter & Strecher, 1995; Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1978). Individuals who are overly optimistic may 
overestimate their control and subsequently take more risks. 
 Level of knowledge – lack of understanding about a topic can impact an individual's 
perception of risk and their subsequent decisions (Fischhoff, 2002). This lack of 
knowledge of security may lead to inappropriate or ineffective decisions (Lacohée, 
Phippen, & Furnell, 2006). 
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 Risk homeostasis – Individuals will change their behaviors to compensate for 
changing levels of perceived risk (Wilde, 2001). Incomplete understanding of a new 
security situation and its associated risks may result in increased risk-taking behaviors 
(Stewart, 2004). 
 Cumulative risk – Small security risks taken by individuals can accumulate into a 
larger, additive risk over time (Fischhoff, 2002). It is shown that individuals have a 
poor understanding of cumulative risk and thus may continue small risk-taking 
behaviors (Slovic, 2000). 
 Omission bias – Failure to perform a correct action is perceived to be less of an issue 
than committing an incorrect action (Ritov & Baron, 1992). For example, individuals 
may perceive the omission of not regularly changing their password to be a less 
significant violation of ISSP than writing their password down. 
 Influence of framing – The likelihood of an individual taking a risk increases when 
possible losses are presented; conversely, risk-taking behaviors decrease when 
possible gains are communicated (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Focusing on the 
communication of gains in security, as opposed to losses, may increase ISSP 
compliance. 
 
Bulgurcu, B., Cavusoglu, H., & Benbasat, I. (2010). Information Security Policy Compliance:  
An empirical study of rationality-based beliefs and information security awareness. MIS 
quarterly, 34(3), 523-548. Retrieved from 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cph&AN=52546353&site=ehost
-live&scope=site 
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Abstract. Many organizations recognize that their employees, who are often considered 
the weakest link in information security, can also be great assets in the effort to reduce 
risk related to information security. Since employees who comply with the information 
security rules and regulations of the organization are the key to strengthening information 
security, under- standing compliance behavior is crucial for organizations that want to 
leverage their human capital. This research identifies the antecedents of employee 
compliance with the information security policy (ISP) of an organization. Specifically, 
we investigate the rationality-based factors that drive an employee to comply with 
requirements of the ISP with regard to protecting the organization’s information and 
technology resources. Drawing on the theory of planned behavior, we posit that, along 
with normative belief and self-efficacy, an employee’s attitude toward compliance 
determines intention to comply with the ISP. As a key contribution, we posit that an 
employee’s attitude is influenced by benefit of compliance, cost of compliance, and cost 
of noncompliance, which are beliefs about the overall assessment of consequences of 
compliance or noncompliance. We then postulate that these beliefs are shaped by the 
employee’s outcome beliefs concerning the events that follow compliance or 
noncompliance: benefit of compliance is shaped by intrinsic benefit, safety of resources, 
and rewards, while cost of compliance is shaped by work impediment; and cost of 
noncompliance is shaped by intrinsic cost, vulnerability of resources, and sanctions. We 
also investigate the impact of information security awareness (ISA) on outcome beliefs 
and an employee’s attitude toward compliance with the ISP. Our results show that an 
employee’s intention to comply with the ISP is significantly influenced by attitude, 
normative beliefs, and self-efficacy to comply. Outcome beliefs significantly affect 
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beliefs about overall assessment of consequences, and they, in turn, significantly affect an 
employee’s attitude. Furthermore, ISA positively affects both attitude and outcome 
beliefs. As the importance of employees’ following their organizations’ information 
security rules and regulations increases, our study sheds light on the role of ISA and 
compliance-related beliefs in an organization’s efforts to encourage compliance. 
Summary. The authors of this article survey 464 employees from diverse organizations 
to examine how beliefs and attitudes towards ISSP compliance and their potential 
outcomes influence one other. The theory of planned behavior (TPB) is used to develop 
hypotheses testing individuals' intention to comply with ISSP requirements by examining 
three areas (Ajzen, 1991): (1) behavioral beliefs based upon participants’ positive values 
assigned to compliance, (2) normative beliefs regarding the perceptions of social pressure 
from peers and managers to comply, and (3) perceived behavioral control as an extension 
of self-efficacy theory that addresses participants' beliefs in their abilities to achieve 
compliance (Bandura, 1977). Relational choice theory (RCT) is used to develop three 
hypotheses that test what participants assess as the: (1) benefits of ISSP compliance as 
they relate to favorable consequences, (2) costs of compliance as "overall expected 
unfavorable consequences," and (3) costs of noncompliance as "overall expected 
unfavorable consequences." In addition, the three RCT hypotheses contain numerous 
sub-hypotheses that address outcome beliefs, including intrinsic benefit, safety of 
resources, rewards, work impediment, intrinsic cost, vulnerability of resources, and 
sanctions. Using a component-based partial least squares analysis, the authors conclude 
that the independent variables of attitude towards compliance, normative beliefs, self-
efficacy, benefits of compliance, costs of compliance, and costs of noncompliance are 
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statistically significant factors influencing the dependent variable of intention to comply 
with ISSP (p < 0.01). 
 
Guo, K. (2013). Security-related behavior in using information systems in the workplace: A  
review and synthesis. Computers & Security, 32, 242-251. doi: 
10.1016/j.cose.2012.10.003 Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404812001666 
Abstract. Security-related behavior in the workplace has recently drawn much attention 
from scholars in the information systems literature. Many studies, however, have reported 
inconsistent and sometimes contradictory results about the effects of some key factors 
such as sanctions. We argue that one of the reasons causing the inconsistent findings is 
the divergent conceptualizations of security-related behavior. In this paper, we conducted 
an extensive review of the divergent concepts. Many of the concepts overlap with each 
other on some dimensions and yet are different on others. By delineating and 
synthesizing the differences, we proposed a framework for conceptualizing security-
related behavior. The framework can facilitate the development of consistent and 
comparable terms and concepts in future studies. Implications for research are also 
discussed. 
Summary. Security-related behaviors as described in the IS literature are first classified 
into seven dimensions: (1) intentionality as intentional or non-intentional, e.g., misuse 
and human error; (2) motive as malicious or non-malicious; (3) expertise to perform a 
behavior; (4) job relatedness as it applies to a behavior; (5) consequence of the behavior, 
such as increasing risk or incurring damage; (6) action vs. inaction, such as policy 
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compliance or omission; and (7) rule violation of both laws and organizational policy. 
With respect to these dimensions, the authors examine several conceptualizations of 
security-related behaviors from the current IS literature: computer abuses/security 
contravention, unethical use, omissive security behavior, IS misuse, violation of policy, 
non-malicious security violation, information security policy abuse, and security policy 
compliance. The review finds "contradictory conclusions were obtained from the same 
theoretical perspective" in the IS literature (Guo, 2013, p. 246). The author further 
attempts to clarify these contradictions and concludes, "many differences exist between 
desirable and undesirable behaviors" (Guo, 2013, p. 248). Based upon this literature 
review, the author proposes a conceptual framework for classifying security-related 
behaviors along the previously defined seven dimensions into four categories: security 
assurance behavior (SAB), security compliant behavior (SCB), security risk-taking 
behavior (SRB), and security damaging behavior (SDB). 
 
Guo, K. H., & Yuan, Y. (2012). The effects of multilevel sanctions on information security  
violations: A mediating model. Information & Management, 49(6), 320-326. doi: 
10.1016/j.im.2012.08.001 Retrieved from  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378720612000584 
Abstract. We proposed and empirically tested a mediating model for examining the 
effects of multilevel sanctions on preventing information security violations in the 
workplace. The results of the experiment suggested that personal self-sanctions and 
workgroup sanctions have significant deterrent effects on employee security violations, 
but that the effect of organizational sanctions becomes insignificant when the other two 
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types of sanctions are taken into account. Theoretically, the study pointed out the 
importance of personal self-sanctions and informal workgroup sanctions. Practically, our 
results suggested that an “influencing” strategy may be more effective than an 
“enforcing” one in information security management. 
Summary. Based upon research by Tyler and Balder (2005), the authors classify 
sanctions in an organizational setting into three categories: (1) organizational sanctions 
as the threat and administration of disciplinary action, (2) workgroup sanctions 
influenced by the approval and disapproval of coworkers, and (3) personal self-sanction 
from employees who have an intrinsic desire to comply with ISSP. The authors propose a 
theoretical framework along with a set of hypotheses that the three sanctions negatively 
influence employee intentions to violate ISSP. Additional hypotheses include that the 
three sanctions will positively influence each other. To test these hypotheses, the authors 
survey a total of 335 organizational computer users via paper and web-based surveys and 
perform a partial least squares regression analysis. Their findings support the hypotheses 
that the independent variables of personal self-sanctions promoting ISSP compliance and 
perceived workgroup sanctions from noncompliance have significant negative influences 
on the dependent variable of intentions to violate security policies with p values < 0.05 
and < 0.001, respectively, and that perceived organizational sanctions from 
noncompliance have no direct, significant effect. Their findings also support the 
hypotheses that the independent variables of perceived organizational sanctions from 
noncompliance and perceived workgroup sanctions from noncompliance have significant 
positive influences on the dependent variable of personal self-sanctions promoting ISSP 
compliance with p values < 0.001. Finally, the authors find that the positive influence of 
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the independent variable perceived organizational sanctions from noncompliance on the 
dependent variable of perceived workgroup sanctions from noncompliance is significant 
with p < 0.001. Participant demographics suggest that senior-level employees are more 
likely to commit ISSP violations than their subordinates. These findings help suggest that 
ISSP compliance can be improved by: (a) better educating employees so they can hold 
themselves accountable, (b) supporting workgroup sanctions by training role models who 
can act as ISSP advocates, and (c) placing less emphasis on enforcing organizational 
sanctions that may have little effect. 
 
Herath, T., & Rao, H.R. (2009). Encouraging information security behaviors in organizations:  
Role of penalties, pressures and perceived effectiveness. Decision Support Systems, 
47(2), 154-165. doi:10.1016/j.dss.2009.02.005 Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167923609000530 
Abstract. Secure management of information systems is crucially important in 
information intensive organizations. Although most organizations have long been using 
security technologies, it is well known that technology tools alone are not sufficient. 
Thus, the area of end-user security behaviors in organizations has gained an increased 
attention. In information security observing end-user security behaviors is challenging. 
Moreover, recent studies have shown that the end users have divergent security views. 
The inability to monitor employee IT security behaviors and divergent views regarding 
security policies, in our view, provide a setting where the principal agent paradigm 
applies. In this paper, we develop and test a theoretical model of the incentive effects of 
penalties, pressures and perceived effectiveness of employee actions that enhances our 
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understanding of employee compliance to information security policies. Based on 312 
employee responses from 77 organizations, we empirically validate and test the model. 
Our findings suggest that security behaviors can be influenced by both intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivators. Pressures exerted by subjective norms and peer behaviors influence 
employee information security behaviors. Intrinsic motivation of employee perceived 
effectiveness of their actions was also found to play an important role in security policy 
compliance intentions. In analyzing the penalties, certainty of detection was found to be 
significant while surprisingly, severity of punishment was found to have a negative effect 
on security behavior intentions. We discuss the implications of our findings for theory 
and practice. 
Summary. This article surveys the behavioral information security literature and 
identifies the theories either used or proposed by others. The authors then discuss their 
own theory based upon agency theory or principal agent paradigm (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
e.g., defined by Herath and Rao (2009a) as "whenever one party (principal) entrusts some 
decision making authority to another party (agent)" (p. 155). The authors propose a 
theoretical framework based upon the incentive mechanisms of penalties, social 
pressures, and perceived effectiveness. This approach includes individual hypotheses that 
the severity of penalty, certainty of penalty, normative beliefs, peer behavior, and 
perceived effectiveness of these incentive mechanisms are all positively associated with 
the intention to comply with ISSPs. To test these hypotheses, the authors survey 312 
participants from 77 different organizations. To determine significance, the authors use a 
partial least squares regression analysis employing a component-based approach for 
estimation with the dependent variable of policy compliance intention. Their findings 
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support all of the hypotheses except for severity of penalty, which actually negatively 
affects intentions of security behavior (p < 0.01). In particular, penalties like dismissal 
may be unlikely to happen and may therefore not increase ISSP compliance intentions. 
Of the five hypotheses, normative beliefs (i.e., perceptions of social pressure from peers 
and managers to comply) is the most statistically significant in support of ISSP 
compliance intentions (p < 0.001). 
 
Huang, D., Rau, P.P. & Salvendy, G. (2007). A survey of factors influencing people’s  
perception of information security. In J. Jacko (Ed.). Human-Computer Interaction, Part 
IV (pp. 906-915). Heidelberg: Springer. Retrieved from 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-73111-5_100 
Abstract. Information security is a great concern to computer users, which is not only a 
technical problem, but also related to human factors. The objective of this study is to 
investigate the factors that can influence people’s perception of different threats to 
information security. In the survey study, 602 respondents were asked to evaluate one of 
21 common threats to information security with regard to its position on each of the 20 
threat-related items. An exploratory factor analysis was then conducted, and a six-factor 
structure modeling people’s perception of different threats to information security was 
derived. The relations between the factors and the perceived overall danger of threats 
were also tested by multiple regression analyses. 
Summary. This article examines numerous influences of risk perception on information 
security. The authors perform a subsequent exploratory factor analysis and survey the IS 
literature to develop and organize a set of 21 common security threats into 12 categories. 
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Examining the existing literature on the psychometric paradigm, the authors develop a set 
of 20 influences on risk perception from a known set of 47 (Covello, 1983, 1992; Covello 
& Merkhofer, 1994; Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Cambs, 1978; Slovic, 1987, 
Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980). To understand the influences of risk perception 
on information security, they survey 646 participants from a single organization and 
asked the participants to rate various influences on risk perception. Initial survey findings 
include the following influences having the largest impact on risk perception of 
information security: the severity of consequences of the threat is serious, ease of 
reduction of the threat's effectiveness, and wide scope of impact by the threat. The 
authors then conduct an exploratory factor analysis, grouping the 20 influences into six 
factors: knowledge, impact, severity, controllability, possibility, and awareness. Stepwise 
multiple regression analysis of survey data reveals a significant, positive effect on the 
dependent variable of perceived dangers of information security for four of the six factors 
(p < 0.001): knowledge, impact, severity, and possibility. Managers may use these factors 
to further develop ISSP with a focus on how users perceive threats and engage in secure 
behaviors. 
 
Ifinedo, P. (2012). Understanding information systems security policy compliance: An  
integration of the theory of planned behavior and the protection motivation theory. 
Computers & Security, 31(1), 83-95. doi:10.1016/j.cose.2011.10.007 Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404811001337 
Abstract. This research investigated information systems security policy (ISSP) 
compliance by drawing upon two relevant theories i.e. the theory of planned behavior 
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(TPB) and the protection motivation theory (PMT). A research model that fused 
constituents of the aforementioned theories was proposed and validated. Relevant 
hypotheses were developed to test the research conceptualization. Data analysis was 
performed using the partial least squares (PLS) technique. Using a survey of 124 business 
managers and IS professionals, this study showed that factors such as self-efficacy, 
attitude toward compliance, subjective norms, response efficacy and perceived 
vulnerability positively influence ISSP behavioral compliance intentions of employees. 
The data analysis did not support perceived severity and response cost as being predictors 
of ISSP behavioral compliance intentions. The study’s implications for research and 
practice are discussed. 
Summary. To better understand the behaviors involved in ISSP compliance, the author 
develops a research model based upon the theory of planned behavior (TPB) and the 
protection motivation theory (PMT) (Ajzen, 1991; Rogers, 1983). The TPB informs how 
the constituents of behavior beliefs, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral controls 
influence an individual's behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Bandura, 1977). The PMT informs both 
an individual's threat appraisal of dangerous events and coping appraisal to cope with a 
threat and avert any negative repercussions (Rogers, 1983). From these theories, the 
author derives seven main constructs that may relate to ISSP compliance behavioral 
intention: subjective norms, attitude, self-efficacy, response cost, response efficacy, 
perceived severity, and perceived vulnerability. To test whether these constructs 
contribute to ISSP compliance, the author conducts a survey with 124 participants, 
representing non-IS managers and IS professionals from a variety of organizations. To 
determine significance, the author uses a Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis. Five 
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independent variables, namely subjective norms (p < 0.01), attitude (p < 0.001), self-
efficacy (p < 0.01), response efficacy (p < 0.01), and perceived vulnerability (p < 0.01) 
increase the dependent variable of ISSP compliance behavior intentions. In contrast, the 
independent variable of perceived severity of sanctions decreases ISSP compliance (p < 
0.05), and the construct of response cost does not affect ISSP compliance behavior 
intentions. The results of this study suggest how ISSP effectiveness can be increased 
through departmental ISSP advocates and by providing additional training to increase 
response and self-efficacy. 
 
Ifinedo, P. (2014). Information systems security policy compliance: An empirical study of the  
effects of socialisation, influence, and cognition. Information & Management, 51(1), 69-
79. doi:10.1016/j.im.2013.10.001 Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378720613000980 
Abstract. This study investigated employees’ information systems security policy (ISSP) 
compliance behavioural intentions in organisations from the theoretical lenses of social 
bonding, social inﬂuence, and cognitive processing. Given that previous research on ISSP 
compliance has been based on deterrence theory, this study seeks to augment and 
diversify research on ISSP compliance through its theoretical perspective. Relevant 
hypotheses were developed to test the research conceptualisation. Data from a survey of 
business managers and IS professionals conﬁrmed that social bonds that are formed at 
work largely inﬂuence attitudes towards compliance and subjective norms, with both 
constructs positively affecting employees’ ISSP compliance. Employees’ locus of control 
and capabilities and competence related to IS security issues also affect ISSP compliance 
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behavioural intentions. Overall, the constructs in the research model enhance our 
understanding of the social-organisational and psychological factors that might encourage 
or accentuate employees’ ISSP compliance in the workplace. 
Summary. To better understand the behaviors involved in ISSP compliance, the author 
develops a research model based upon the theory of planned behavior (TPB), social 
cognitive theory (SCT), and social bond theory (SBT) (Ajzen, 1991; Bandura, 1977; 
Hirschi, 2002). The TPB informs how the constituents of behavior beliefs, subjective 
norms, and perceived behavioral controls influence an individual's behavior (Ajzen, 
1991; Bandura, 1977). The SCT informs how an individual learns based upon his/her 
environment, addressing both an individual's locus of control and self-efficacy (Bandura, 
1977; Rotter, 1966; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008). The SBT informs how an 
individual maintains social bonds with others in his/her organization and classifies these 
bonds as attachment, commitment, involvement, or personal norms (Hirschi, 2002). From 
the theories, the author derives eight main constructs that may relate to ISSP compliance 
behavioral intentions: attachment, commitment, involvement, personal norms, subjective 
norms, attitude, locus of control, and self-efficacy. To test whether these constructs 
contribute to ISSP compliance, the authors conduct a survey of 124 non-IS managers and 
IS professionals from a variety of organizations. To determine significance, the author 
uses a partial least squares analysis. The independent variables from TPB and SCT 
increase the dependent variable of ISSP compliance behavioral intentions, with attitude 
toward ISSP compliance being the most highly significant (p < 0.001). All bonds from 
SBT positively influence attitude toward ISSP compliance except for attachment, which 
negatively influences it (p < 0.01). The author suggests that "it is possible for an 
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employee to have a positive attitude about his or her organisation’s ISSP yet hold 
differing perceptions from coworkers" (Ifinedo, 2014, p. 75). The SBT bonds of 
attachment (p < 0.05) and personal norms (p < 0.01) as independent variables positively 
influence the dependent variable of subjective norms, while commitment and 
involvement do not influence subjective norms. This study suggests that ISSP compliance 
can be increased by addressing it as a social issue and by creating delegating individuals 
to act as ISSP advocates. In addition, an increase in ISSP compliance may be possible 
through regular communication, training, and streamlining of procedures. 
 
Liginlal, D., Sim, I., & Khansa, L. (2009). How significant is human error as a cause of privacy  
breaches? An empirical study and a framework for error management. Computers & 
Security, 28(3), 215-228. doi: 10.1016/j.cose.2008.11.003 Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404808001181 
Abstract. Privacy breaches and their regulatory implications have attracted corporate 
attention in recent times. An often overlooked cause of privacy breaches is human error. 
In this study, we first apply a model based on the widely accepted GEMS error typology 
to analyze publicly reported privacy breach incidents within the U.S. Then, based on an 
examination of the causes of the reported privacy breach incidents, we propose a defense-
in-depth solution strategy founded on error avoidance, error interception, and error 
correction. Finally, we illustrate the application of the proposed strategy to managing 
human error in the case of the two leading causes of privacy breach incidents. This study 
finds that mistakes in the information processing stage constitute the most cases of 
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human error-related privacy breach incidents, clearly highlighting the need for effective 
policies and their enforcement in organizations. 
Summary. This article examines organizational privacy breaches due to human error 
using Reason's (1990) generic error modeling system (GEMS). The GEMS defines 
human errors as either a slip by incorrectly performing a correct action or a mistake by 
correctly performing an incorrect action based upon a wrong decision. To apply the 
GEMS model, the authors compile and analyze a data set of 701 documented U.S. 
privacy breach incidents due to human error between 2005 and 2008. The authors then 
perform a literature review of methods to address human error in data breaches and 
propose a three-part error management program: (1) analysis of the top causes of 
breaches, which include equipment loss, Internet threats, and inappropriate skill when 
using IT; (2) developing a defense-in-depth error management strategy based upon error 
avoidance, error interception, and error correction; and (3) a periodic analysis of the 
effectiveness of the strategy during error correction. Error avoidance focuses on 
employee training and enhancing the usability of the systems susceptible to misuse. Error 
interception focuses on better controlling workflows, introducing artificial delays, and 
frequent audits. In contrast, error correction focuses on timely feedback, root cause 
analysis, and computer-based decision support systems to assist in decision-making. By 
using this three-part error management program to address human error, managers can 
better enhance ISSP compliance within their organizations. 
 
Padayachee, K. (2012). Taxonomy of compliant information security behavior. Computers &  
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Security, 31(5), 673-680. doi: 10.1016/j.cose.2012.04.004 Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016740481200065X 
Abstract. This paper aims at surveying the extrinsic and intrinsic motivations that 
influence the propensity toward compliant information security behavior. Information 
security behavior refers to a set of core information security activities that have to be 
adhered to by end-users to maintain information security as defined by information 
security policies. The intention is to classify the research done on compliant information 
security behavior from an end-user perspective and arrange it as a taxonomy predicated 
on Self-Determination Theory (SDT). In addition, the relative significance of factors that 
contribute to compliant information security behavior is evaluated on the basis of 
empirical studies. The taxonomy will be valuable in providing a comprehensive overview 
of the factors that influence compliant information security behavior and in identifying 
areas that require further research. 
Summary. The author of this article presents a new taxonomy, the Classification of 
Security Compliant Behavior, predicted on Self-determination Theory (CSCBSDT). This 
work derives from the human motivation taxonomy of Ryan and Deci (2000), which 
draws upon their earlier work on self-determination theory (SDT) (Deci & Ryan, 1985). 
Ryan and Deci (1985) classify motivation as intrinsic, extrinsic, or amotivation, the latter 
being where an individual is not motivated to act due to a lack of competence or the 
perceived lack of value of an activity. Ryan and Deci (2000) further classify extrinsic 
motivation into four constructs of regulation: (1) external, such as the potential for 
reward or sanction; (2) introjection, where one acts to maintain self-esteem; (3) 
identification, when an individual accepts a situation as important; and (4) integration, 
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where the goal is completely incorporated with the individual's beliefs and needs. The 
author further develops the CSCBSDT  by surveying the empirical literature of compliant 
security behavior to create a total of five ranks in the taxonomy. The third taxonomic 
rank of CSCBSDT  includes deterrent controls, social climate, awareness, threat appraisal, 
and coping appraisal. The fourth taxonomic rank includes mechanisms and behavioral 
constructs, such as sanctions as a type of deterrent control. The fifth taxonomic rank 
includes individual attributes like severity of punishment for sanctions. The findings of 
this article provide a foundation for organizations to classify and identify the extrinsic 
motivations of ISSP compliance. 
 
Pahnila, S., Siponen, M., & Mahmood, A. (2007, January 3-6). Employees’ behavior towards  
IS security policy compliance. Paper presented at the 40th Annual Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences. doi:10.1109/HICSS.2007.206 Retrieved from 
http://www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings/hicss/2007/2755/00/index.html 
Abstract. The literature agrees that the major threat to IS security is constituted by 
careless employees who do not comply with organizations’ IS security policies and 
procedures. To address this concern, different approaches for ensuring employees’ IS 
security policy compliance have been proposed. Prior research on IS security compliance 
has criticized these extant IS security awareness approaches as lacking theoretically and 
empirically grounded principles to ensure that employees comply with IS security 
policies. To fill this gap, this study proposes a theoretical model that contains the factors 
that explain employees’ IS security policy compliance. Data (N=245) from a Finnish 
company provides empirical support for the model. The results suggest that information 
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quality has a significant effect on actual IS security policy compliance. Employees’ 
attitude, normative beliefs and habits have significant effect on intention to comply with 
IS security policy. Threat appraisal and facilitating conditions have significant impact on 
attitude towards complying, while coping appraisal does not have a significant effect on 
employees’ attitude towards complying. Sanctions have insignificant effect on intention 
to comply with IS security policy and rewards do not have a significant effect on actual 
compliance with IS security policy. 
Summary. To better understand the behaviors involved in ISSP compliance, the authors 
develop a research model using the theory of reasoned action (TRA), general deterrence 
theory (GDT), protection motivation theory (PMT), information systems success, and 
Triandis' behavioral framework (Ajzen, 1991; DeLone & MacLean, 1992; Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975; Straub, 1990; Straub & Welke, 1998; Rogers, 1983; Rippetoe & Rogers, 
1987; Triandis, 1980). The TRA informs how an individual's attitude toward compliance 
and intention to comply influences his or her actual compliance (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; 
Ajzen, 1991). The GDT informs how the severity and timeliness of sanctions influence 
compliance (Straub, 1990; Straub & Welke, 1998). The PMT informs both an individual's 
threat appraisal of dangerous events and coping appraisal to cope with a threat and avert 
any negative repercussions (Rogers, 1983; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997; Rippetoe & 
Rogers, 1987). DeLone and MacLean (1992) define information systems success, e.g., 
ISSP compliance, as being influenced by information quality measured by an individual's 
perceived importance and usefulness of the information. Triandis' (1980) behavioral 
framework informs how habits and facilitating conditions, such as resources, influence 
intentions and attitudes towards ISSP compliance (Limayem & Hirt, 2003; McCoy & 
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Fowler, 2004; Triandis, 1980). In addition, the authors draw upon the constructs of 
rewards and normative beliefs for their model (Cameron & Pierce, 2002; Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975). From the theories, the authors derive 10 main constructs that may relate to 
actual ISSP compliance: sanctions, threat appraisal, coping appraisal, normative beliefs, 
information quality, facilitating conditions, habits, rewards, attitude towards coping, and 
intention to comply. To test whether these constructs contribute to actual ISSP 
compliance, the authors conduct a survey of 240 participants from a Finnish company. 
The authors use a multiple regression analysis in their study, which demonstrates the 
independent variables of threat appraisal (p < 0.001) and facilitating conditions (p < 
0.001) both have a significant, positive effect on the dependent variable of attitude 
towards complying with ISSP. The independent variables of attitude towards complying 
(p < 0.001), normative beliefs (p < 0.001), and habits (p < 0.05) all have a significant, 
positive effect on the dependent variable of intention to comply with ISSP. Finally, the 
independent variables of intention to comply (p < 0.001) and information quality (p < 
0.05) have a significant, positive effect on the dependent variable of actual compliance. 
The constructs of coping appraisal, sanctions, and rewards do not affect ISSP 
compliance. The findings of this study can be used to design an ISSP with focus on 
constructs that may increase compliance. 
 
Rhee, H. S., Kim, C., & Ryu, Y. U. (2009). Self-efficacy in information security: Its influence  
on end users' information security practice behavior. Computers & Security, 28(8), 816-
826. doi: 10.1016/j.cose.2009.05.008 Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016740480900056X 
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Abstract. The ultimate success of information security depends on appropriate 
information security practice behaviors by the end users. Based on social cognitive 
theory, this study models and tests relationships among self-efficacy in information 
security, security practice behavior and motivation to strengthen security efforts. This 
study also explores antecedents to individuals' self-efficacy beliefs in information 
security. Results provide support for the many hypothesized relationships. This study 
provides an initial step toward understanding of the applicability of social cognitive 
theory in a new domain of information security. The results suggest that simply listing 
what not to do and penalties associated with a wrong doing in the users' information 
security policy alone will have a limited impact on effective implementation of security 
measures. The findings may help information security professionals design security 
awareness programs that more effectively increase the self-efficacy in information 
security. 
Summary. To better understand the behaviors involved in ISSP compliance, the authors 
develop a research model based upon self-efficacy using social cognitive theory 
(Bandura, 1986; Ozer & Bandura, 1990). Self-efficacy addresses an individual's belief in 
his/her own ability to accomplish a task or reach a goal (Bandura, 1986; Ozer & Bandura, 
1990). Bandura (1997) advises that researchers consider the context of self-efficacy when 
attempting to measure its effect. Rhee, Kim, and Ryu (2009) address this by defining 
self-efficacy in information security (SEIS) as "a belief in one’s capability to protect 
information and information systems from unauthorized disclosure, modification, loss, 
destruction, and lack of availability" (p. 818). From social cognitive theory, the authors 
hypothesize that the following factors influence SEIS: (1) previous computer/Internet 
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experience, (2) previous experiences with security breach incidents, and (3) the 
perception of having general controllability over information security threats. The 
authors also present a second set of hypotheses where individuals with higher SEIS (1) 
engage in the use of more security practice – technology such as protection software; (2) 
demonstrate more security practice – care behavior in the form of ISSP compliance; and 
(3) demonstrate a long-term intention to strengthen security effort through activities, such 
as continuing information security education. To test these hypotheses, the authors 
conduct a survey with 415 graduate students majoring in business. The authors use a 
partial least squares regression analysis in their study with the dependent variable of SEIS 
for the first set of hypotheses. Computer/Internet experience (p < 0.001) and general 
controllability (p < 0.01) as independent variables are shown to have a significant, 
positive influence on SEIS. However, the independent variable of previous experience 
with security breach incidents (p < 0.05) has a significant negative effect on SEIS. The 
second set of hypotheses that the independent variable of SEIS positively influences the 
dependent variables of security practice – technology (p < 0.001), security practice – care 
behavior (p < 0.001), and intention to strengthen security efforts (p < 0.001) are 
supported. The results of this study can be used in development of SEIS training to 
enhance ISSP compliance. 
  
Son, J. (2011). Out of fear or desire? Toward a better understanding of employees’ motivation to  
follow IS security policies. Information & Management, 48(7), 296-302. doi: 
10.1016/j.im.2011.07.002 Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378720611000681 
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Abstract. Given the significant role of people in the management of security, attention 
has recently been paid to the issue of how to motivate employees to improve security 
performance of organizations. However, past work has been dependent on deterrence 
theory rooted in an extrinsic motivation model to help understand why employees do or 
do not follow security rules in their organization. We postulated that we could better 
explain employees’ security-related rule-following behavior with an approach rooted in 
an intrinsic motivation model. We therefore developed a model of employees’ motivation 
to comply with IS security policies which incorporated both extrinsic and intrinsic 
models of human behavior. It was tested with data collected through a survey of 602 
employees in the United States. We found that variables rooted in the intrinsic motivation 
model contributed significantly more to the explained variance of employees’ compliance 
than did those rooted in the extrinsic motivation model. 
Summary. The author of this study develops a research model using both intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations to better understand how they influence ISSP compliance. Intrinsic 
motivation hypotheses test the influence of an individual's perceived legitimacy of ISSP 
and perceived value congruence, i.e., employers and employees sharing the same value 
set, on ISSP compliance (Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 2005). Using general deterrence 
theory, extrinsic motivation hypotheses test the influence of an individual's perceived 
deterrent certainty and perceived deterrent severity of sanctions on ISSP non-compliance 
(Straub, 1990; Straub & Welke, 1998). The influences of control variables, such as 
gender and computer self-efficacy, on ISSP compliance are also examined. To test these 
hypotheses, the author conducts a survey with a nation-wide sample of 602 participants. 
The authors use a partial least squares regression analysis in their study with the 
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dependent variable of ISSP compliance. The intrinsic motivations of perceived 
legitimacy (p < 0.001) and value congruence (p < 0.05) as independent variables both 
positively influence ISSP compliance. In contrast, the extrinsic motivations of perceived 
deterrent certainty and severity as independent variables have no significant influence on 
ISSP compliance. Further, the independent control variable of computer self-efficacy (p < 
0.05) has a significant, positive influence on ISSP compliance. The implications from this 
study are that organizations should focus on aligning organizational ISSP values with 
employee values to increase compliance. Moreover, information security training and 
education increases the perceived legitimacy of ISSP. 
 
Vance, A., Siponen, M., & Pahnila, S. (2012). Motivating IS security compliance: Insights  
from habit and protection motivation theory. Information & Management, 49(3-4), 190-
198. doi: 10.1016/j.im.2012.04.002 Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378720612000328 
Abstract. Employees’ failure to comply with IS security procedures is a key concern for 
organizations today. A number of socio-cognitive theories have been used to explain this. 
However, prior studies have not examined the influence of past and automatic behavior 
on employee decisions to comply. This is an important omission because past behavior 
has been assumed to strongly affect decision-making. To address this gap, we integrated 
habit (a routinized form of past behavior) with Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), to 
explain compliance. An empirical test showed that habitual IS security compliance 
strongly reinforced the cognitive processes theorized by PMT, as well as employee 
intention for future compliance. We also found that nearly all components of PMT 
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significantly impacted employee intention to comply with IS security policies. Together, 
these results highlighted the importance of addressing employees’ past and automatic 
behavior in order to improve compliance. 
Summary. The authors develop a research model using protection motivation theory 
(PMT) and habit, i.e., routinized behavior, to explain ISSP compliance (Limayem & Hirt, 
2003; Rogers, 1983; Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). The PMT informs both an individua l's 
threat appraisal of dangerous events and coping appraisal to cope with a threat and avert 
any negative repercussions (Rogers, 1983). The instrument of Verplanken and Orbell 
(2003) examines the concept of habit; this instrument addresses not only behavioral 
frequency but also automaticity, i.e., performing an action without a conscious decision. 
From the PMT, the authors develop a set of hypotheses that the following constructs 
influence an individual's intention to comply with ISSP: (1) assessment of organizational 
vulnerability to threats, (2) perceived severity of threats, (3) the rewards of saving time 
by not complying with ISSP, (4) response efficacy as the belief a protective behavior will 
avoid a threat, (5) individual self-efficacy in implementing a protective behavior, and (6) 
response cost of implementing a protective behavior. An additional set of hypotheses 
examines the influence of habit on the six PMT hypotheses. To test these hypotheses, the 
authors conduct a survey of 210 participants, representing clerical and administrative 
staff from a Finnish, municipal organization and perform a partial least squares 
regression analysis of the data from the survey results. The independent variable of habit 
has a significant influence on all six dependent variable constructs of PMT (p < 0.03) as 
they relate to the intention to comply with ISSP. The independent variables of perceived 
severity (p < 0.01) and self-efficacy (p < 0.01) have a positive effect on the dependent 
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variable of intention to comply with ISSP, whereas the independent variables of rewards 
(p < 0.03), response efficacy (p < 0.01), and response cost (p < 0.05) have a negative 
effect on the intention to comply. The independent variable of assessed vulnerability has 
no effect on the intention to comply. Thus, the intention to comply with ISSP increases 
by improving the usability systems that enact ISSP. In addition, compliance may increase 
with IS security education that stresses the potential vulnerability and severity of threats. 
 
Vroom, C., & Von Solms, R. (2004). Towards information security behavioural compliance.  
Computers & Security, 23(3), 191-198. doi: 10.1016/j.cose.2004.01.012 Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016740480400032X 
Abstract. Auditing has always played an important role in the business environment. 
With the introduction of information technology and the resulting security challenges that 
organizations face daily, it has become essential to ensure the security of the 
organization's information and other valuable assets. However, one aspect that auditing 
does not cover effectively is that of the behaviour of the employee, which is so crucial to 
any organization's security. The objective of this paper is to explore the potential 
problems concerning the attempt to audit the behaviour of the employee. It will be 
demonstrated that it is extremely difficult to audit human behaviour and so an alternative 
method to behavioural auditing needs to be found, where policing the employee is not 
necessary, but instead a softer, more informal approach is used to change the culture to a 
more information security conscious one. 
Summary. This article addresses the challenges of auditing employee behavior and 
offers an alternative method to improve organizational ISSP compliance. The authors 
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examine the evaluation of employee behavior in the context of performance appraisals. 
Performance appraisals may lack reliability and validity, leading to unreliable 
information (Szilagyi & Wallace, 1990), and numerous factors distort actual from 
assessed performance (Cooper, 1981). The authors propose a means to address 
organizational culture so that employee behavior is in line with organizational objectives 
like ISSP compliance. They recognize Schein's (1999) model of organizational culture, 
which defines three layers: (1) artifacts and creations; (2) espoused values, norms, and 
knowledge; and (3) basic assumptions and beliefs or tacit assumptions. The authors 
suggest that changing these layers to be more in line with ISSP compliance can result in 
employees adjusting their behaviors towards greater ISSP compliance. Additionally, 
Szilagyi and Wallace (1990) categorize organizational behavior into three levels: 
individual, group, and formal organization. Each level influences the other, and all three 
must improve their influence on ISSP compliance in order to guide the culture of the 
organization towards greater ISSP compliance (Szilagyi & Wallace, 1990). Schein's 
(1999) Organizational Culture Model demonstrates its interaction with Szilagyi and 
Wallace’s (1990) categories and informs focus areas to increase ISSP compliance. The 
findings of this study provide a model for managers to improve individual employee 
ISSP compliance without direct auditing by addressing the organizational culture as a 
whole. 
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Conclusion 
This annotated bibliography summarizes literature addressing employee behavioral 
factors that influence ISSP compliance. Relevant literature regarding behavioral constructs in the 
areas of biases, beliefs, perceptions, and motivations are summarized. The research goal of this 
annotated bibliography is to examine the employee behavioral factors on which managers should 
focus within their organizations to improve ISSP compliance.  
Employee behavior is often considered the "weakest link" in information security 
(Huang, Rau, & Salvendy, 2007; Ifinedo, 2014; Warkentin & Willison, 2009). Addressing 
employee behaviors is important, as information security cannot be achieved exclusively by 
technological means (Herath & Rao, 2009). ISSP allows for the influence of employee behaviors 
as they pertain to the use of organizational information systems (Ifinedo, 2012). Managers play a 
key role in supporting organizational ISSP compliance due to their influence (Ifinedo, 2014; 
Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007; Ruighaver, Maynard, & Chang, 2007). Managers can 
improve ISSP compliance by focusing on the following behavioral constructs and social 
contexts. 
Human Error 
Numerous perception biases may influence an individual’s incorrect assessment of and 
response to security risks. A report from the Australian Government, Department of Defence, 
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Division, Defence Science and 
Technology Organization (2010) highlights several theories related to perception biases as they 
apply to failed ISSP compliance, which are listed in the table below. 
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Table 1 
Perception biases of security risks and their impact on ISSP compliance.  
Theory Description References 
Availability 
heuristic 
Misunderstanding the likelihood and importance of a 
current event based upon its memorability, leading to 
inappropriate responses, e.g., underestimating the 
day-to-day impact of poor ISSP procedures as 
opposed to a one-time, dramatic hacking incidence. 
Slovic, Fischhoff, 
& Lichtenstein, 
1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973 
Optimism bias The belief that negative events will happen to others 
and not to themselves, e.g., individuals think that they 
would not be the target of hackers because they don’t 
manage sensitive information resulting in lower ISSP 
compliance. 
McIlwraith, 2006; 
Sjöberg, 2000; 
Weinstein, 1987 
Level of control Individuals may underestimate the significance of a 
security risk if they believe that they can control their 
environments. An overestimation of control can result 
in individuals taking more security risks. 
Kreuter & Strecher, 
1995; Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1978 
Level of 
knowledge 
Lack of knowledge about a security risk can bias an 
individual’s assessment, which in turn leads to an 
inappropriate or ineffective response. 
Fischhoff, 2002; 
Lacohée, Phippen, 
& Furnell, 2006 
Risk 
homeostasis 
As a situation changes, individuals adjust their 
behaviors accordingly to maintain a specific level of 
exposure to risk. Incomplete understanding of new 
security situations may lead to increased risk-taking 
behaviors. 
Stewart, 2004; 
Wilde, 2001 
Cumulative risk Individuals may not be aware that taking small 
security risks can accumulate into a larger, additive 
risk over time. 
Fischhoff, 2002; 
Slovic, 2000 
Omission bias Failing to comply with ISSP is perceived to be less of 
an issue than a direct violation of ISSP, e.g., failing to 
periodically change a password is less of an infraction 
than writing it down. 
Ritov & Baron, 
1992 
Influence of 
framing 
Risk-taking behaviors may increase if only the 
negative effects of ISSP non-compliance are 
communicated as opposed to potential security gains. 
Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979 
 
Human factors, such as perception biases, are not completely avoidable; therefore, the 
best course of action is to acknowledge their potential effects and develop mitigation strategies to 
improve ISSP compliance. Liginlal, Sim, and Khansa (2009) suggest using a three-part defense-
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in-depth error management strategy to address causes of human error: (1) error avoidance 
focusing on employee training and enhancing the usability of the systems susceptible to misuse; 
(2) error interception focusing on frequent audits, better control of workflows with additional 
security checks and cross-verification by peers or supervisors, and introducing artificial delays to 
allow employees to self-detect errors they have committed; and (3) error correction focusing on 
timely feedback, root-cause analysis, and computer-based decision support systems to assist in 
decision making.  
Beliefs and Perceptions 
The following areas demonstrate a positive influence on ISSP compliance: 
Attitude. Employee beliefs about the outcomes of ISSP compliance and noncompliance 
have a direct impact on their attitudes, which influence ISSP compliance (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, 
& Benbasat, 2010; Herath & Rao, 2009). Subjective and personal norms, along with the 
perceived vulnerability and severity of security threats, are also shown to have an effect on 
employee attitudes, thereby influencing ISSP compliance (Ifinedo, 2014; Pahnila, Siponen, & 
Mahmood, 2007). Creating a culture of information security awareness (ISA) through repeated 
training sessions, regular meetings, and IS campaigns can help improve employee attitudes 
(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Ifinedo, 2012; Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007; 
Son, 2011). Training should focus on the benefits of compliance, the costs of compliance, and 
the costs of noncompliance (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010). 
Normative beliefs. Social influence, expectations, and pressure from peers and superiors 
directly influence ISSP compliance (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Herath & Rao, 
2009; Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007). To promote ISSP compliance, managers should 
foster a security climate by making their expectations clear, highlighting the importance of ISSP 
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compliance, and reiterating that employee efforts make a difference in achieving organizational 
security goals (Herath & Rao, 2009; Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007). Managers can also 
influence normative beliefs by identifying influential people within the organization and 
empowering them with the role of ISSP champion (Ifinedo, 2012, 2014). Ifinedo (2014) also 
notes that individuals are more likely to comply with ISSP when the topic is addressed as a 
social issue that impacts their coworkers. Hosting ISA sessions and providing regular ISSP 
training influence individual beliefs that in turn positively influence normative beliefs (Ifinedo, 
2014). 
Self-efficacy. Self-efficacy theory addresses an individual’s belief in his/her ability to and 
knowledge of how to follow and achieve ISSP compliance (Bandura, 1977; Bulgurcu, 
Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Rhee, Kim, & Ryu, 2009). Importantly, training provides the 
knowledge, skills, and hands-on practice to ensure that employees can confidently achieve ISSP 
compliance and believe in their abilities to do so (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010). To 
improve self-efficacy, managers should support employees with time and resources to learn new 
security-related technologies and skills that directly benefit the organization’s ISSP goals 
(Ifiendo, 2012). 
Positive Extrinsic Motivations 
The following factors are shown to provide positive extrinsic motivations and have a 
positive influence on ISSP compliance: 
Reducing the perceived costs of compliance. Employees who perceive ISSP 
compliance as interfering with their daily job or as a burden may be less motivated to comply 
(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010). Managers can increase compliance by clearly 
allocating a portion of employee time to achieve compliance and reducing the perception that 
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compliance activities interfere with job duties (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010). 
Managers can also increase ISSP compliance by promoting usability reviews to ensure that 
organizational ISSP is streamlined, efficient, relevant, and not perceived as cumbersome 
(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012). 
Improved threat appraisal. The constructs of perceived vulnerability to and perceived 
severity of information security threats comprise the concept of threat appraisal (Pahnila, 
Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007). Research shows that an increase of these two perceptions 
independently or together can have a positive influence on ISSP compliance (Huang, Rau, & 
Salvendy, 2007; Ifinedo, 2012; Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007; Vance, Siponen, & 
Pahnila, 2012). To increase ISSP compliance, managers need to make employees aware of 
potential vulnerabilities and resulting severe consequences, which can be accomplished through 
seminars, training sessions, posters, and email (Ifinedo, 2012; Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 
2007; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012). 
Personal responsibility and informal workgroup sanctions. Employees who feel 
personal responsibility to comply with ISSP are shown to have reduced intentions to violate ISSP 
(Guo & Yuan, 2012). Managers can increase feelings of responsibility by focusing on ISSP 
training as it directly relates to business risks as opposed to ISSP training with little or no 
business context (Guo & Yuan, 2012). Workgroups influence individual employees by 
expressing disapproval of an individual’s intentions to violate ISSP (Guo & Yuan, 2012). 
Managers can increase the positive influence of workgroups by training security role models 
who advocate behaviors related to ISSP compliance (Guo & Yuan, 2012). 
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